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ABSTRACT: The report focuses on building aspects of state assessment of the Chernobyl NPP forth power 
unit building structures, damaged in the accident on the 26th of April, 1986, as well as newly constructed 
“Shelter” Object (SO) structures. In the report there are characteristics of damage of the Chernobyl NPP forth 
power unit, description of the structural scheme of “Shelter” Object and its current state. The measures on 
strengthening (stabilization) of the unstable structures, realized on “Shelter” Object, are considered and the 
basic provisions for Strategy of formation “Shelter” Object as an ecologically safe system are given. Attention 
is paid to stages of new safe confinement (NSC) concept selection and characteristics of the NSC and its basic 
objects are given. It took 25 years after the accident. During this time a lot of works on decontamination of the 
local zone territory, ensuring personnel and population radiation safety and strengthening of some unstable 
structures were realized. But the problem of the object safety is actual at present. The consequences of the 
nuclear accident on the ChNPP forth power unit have long-term danger for personnel, population and 
environment. In the report there is analysis and comparison of ChNPP and “Fukusima-1” Japanese NPP 
accident consequences; attention is paid to consequences of the unfavorable catastrophic natural phenomena 
influence. 
1 INTRODUCTON  
Preliminary assessment of dangers and levels of 
territory radiation contamination after explosion 
[1] showed that inside the SO there is more than 
95% of highly active fuel [6]. On the object site 
under the gravel, concrete and sand layer there is 
minimum 0,75 t of fuel. The total area of the West 
Europe country territories with level of 
contamination of 137Cs made up about 280 
thousand km2, because of the Chernobyl accident 
of more than 20 kBq/m2 (it is almost 10 times 
higher than global background). At present the 
total radioactivity of materials in SO premises 




Most of the reactor block building structures were 
destroyed or damaged (Fig.1). 
The central hall tent structures above the elevation 
of + 53.00 are completely destroyed, floor 
structures and walls of drum separator premises, 
also covering above the main circulating pumps 
from the north and south sides are destroyed. The 
upper slab of biological shielding (scheme 
“Elena”) weighting 2000 tons with remains of fuel 
channels was planted, and it took position at an 
angle of 15° to the vertical. The metal structures of 




the reactor base (scheme “RB”) were lowed by 4,0 









Fig. 1 General view of the destroyed ChNPP forth 
power unit structures: 
a – the first days after the accident; b – destroyed frame 
of the deaeration stack; c – ventilation shaft of the 
reactor; d - the beginning of construction. 
 
The upper storeys of the deaeration stack (above 
the elevation of +24,3 m) in axes of 42 – 52 were 
seriously damaged (destroy of the bearing structure 
reinforcement) and deviated by 0,7 – 1,5 m in the 
southern direction from the vertical position. The 
reinforced concrete wall of the western frame 
along the axis 50 is deviated by 64 – 85 cm in the 
west direction. The northern and southern 
reinforced concrete ventilation shafts were 
significantly weakened in bore cross section. 
The degree of structure destroying is not classified 
according to the requirements of the modern 
norms. Some structures were and are in postcritical 
state. Their bearing capacity is exhausted. 
Consequences of the ChNPP forth power unit 
accident remain in the sphere of public attention 
and make people of Ukraine, Russia, Byelorussia 
and other countries to worry. Over the years a lot 
of researches, construction and installation works 
were realized to improve the SO safety. 
2 CONSTRUCTION OF THE 
“SARCOPHAGUS”. STRUCTURAL SURVEYS 
OF THE “SHELTER” OBJECT (THE FIRST 
PHASE, 1986 – 1991). 
The structural surveys of the ChNPP forth power 
unit were realized immediately after the accident 
of 1986 by specialists of different Russian, 
Ukrainian and Belorussian organizations: the 
I.V.Kurchatov institute of atomic energy, complex 
expedition of the Kurchatov institute, the 
A.Khlopin radium institute, VNIPIET, NIKIET, 
Institute for problems of electrodynamics of 
Academy of sciences of Ukraine, Institute of 
nuclear energy of Academy of sciences of 
Belorussia and many other organizations. 
On November, 1986 the protective structure – 
“SARCOPHAGUS” was built around the 
destroyed structures. Construction was realized in 
short time under conditions of extremely 
unfavourable radiation environment at use of the 
remote sensing methods of erection, using unitized 
units (Fig.2). At construction of 
“SARCOPHAGUS” 250 000 m3 of concrete is laid 
and 7000 tons of metal structures are mounted. 
From April, 27 to May, 10 in the period of active 
accident phase at destroying of the forth power unit 
15000 tons of different materials: lead shot – 1500 
t, lead ingots – 5220 t, marble chips – 3532 t, 
dolomite – 1167 t, boron carbide – 42 t, rubber – 
489 t, zeolite – 1890 t, polymerizable liquid – 140 
t, trisodium phosphate – 1536 t were ejected from 
the helicopters. 
 








Fig. 2 Liquidation of the accident consequences, 1986: 
a – territory decontamination from the helicopters; 
b – construction of the western buttress wall, using the 
metal blocks, filled by concrete. 
 
The north cascade wall of “SARCOPHAGUS” was 
made of concrete with ledges up to 12 m. Internal 
volume of the cascade wall ledges was filled by 
spatial structures, including containers with highly 
radioactive wastes. 
The western side of the destroyed unit was closed 
by metal buttress wall, height of which is about 50 
m. Barriers and walls, which separate the forth and 
the third power units, are erected. In the control 
room the monolithic wall, thickness of which is 2,3 
m, was erected to a height up to the elevation of 
+19,0. General view of new structure is given in 
Fig.3. Along the perimeter of the structure there 
are “pioneer” protection walls of reinforced 
concrete, height of which is 6 – 8 m. The destroyed 
structures of the forth power unit were used as 
supports for newly erected SO structures. 
In 1989 the USSR state committee for 
construction, architectural and housing policy 
decided to have NIISK as leading organization on 
preparing of the Building program to assess state 
and monitoring of the SO building structures. In 
1991 – 1995 the works on studying of the SO state 
were realized by Ukrainian organizations under the 
leadership of “Shelter” ISTC (at present ISP NPP) 
of the National academy of sciences of Ukraine 
and NIISK of the State committee for construction, 
architectural and housing policy of Ukraine. 
The general SO structural system is (see Fig. 4): 
- a system of the reinforced concrete and 
metal forth power unit structures, destroyed 
by explosion; 
- a system of SO roof structures, including 
new metal structures, erected in 1986; 
- a support contour, which supports the roof 
system; 
- a foundation – basement part (monolithic 
reinforced concrete foundation slabs and a 
system of longitudinal and transverse walls 
up to the elevation of +12,0 m). 
The results of the preliminary field surveys showed 
that according to the requirements of the normative 
documents the SO building structures are 
destroyed and in transcendental stage of 
deformation. It is impossible to assess their 








Fig. 3 “Shelter” Object view: a - in 1986; b - in 2011. 
 





Fig. 4 “Shelter” Object protection structure location 
 
3  “SHELTER” OBJECT STATE 
Following results of surveys and studying of the 
object, it is clear that its current state is 
characterized by risks, caused by combined 
influences of some factors [6,7], among which are: 
influence of the natural initial events, building 
structure state, behaviour of fuel-containing 
materials (FCM) in object, fire danger. 
The natural initial events are: climatic conditions 
on the site (distribution of air temperatures, 
influence of snow and wind, atmospheric 
circulation), formation of ice and hoarfrost, 
snowstorms and thunderstorms, tornados, tectonic 
features of the area (design and maximal calculated 
earthquakes) and hydrological factors [3, 4, 5]. 
The current state of SO building structures during 
operation is determined by behaviour of critical 
zones in external SO shell, which were found on 
the basis of field surveys and generalization of 
their results. Criteria for critical zones are loads 
from the impacts of design earthquakes, tornados, 
snowfall and other natural events, at which 
structure stability can be damaged. Such zones are: 
- stack on the block “B” (ventilation pipe); 
- Б1 and Б2 beam supports in row “Ж”; 
- frame of the SO western zone; 
- southern shields – “sticks”; 





The analysis of deaeration stack frame geodetic 
survey results shows a constant tendency of frame 
deviation in the southern direction. The process of 
structure degradation continues. According to 
NIISK data, the corrosion of metal structures can 
be up to 40 – 50 micrometers per year of operation. 
The general service life of metal structures is 80 
years. Concrete is exposed to moisture, freezing 
and thaw, what causes destroying and reduction of 
concrete structural strength. 
FCM behaviour is related to the change of their 
properties in time. The silicate matrix of lava-like 
fuel-containing masses is destroyed in time. 
Radionuclides, containing in it, transfer to movable 
radioactive formations, which can go outside the 
SO and have danger for personnel, population and 
environment. Destroying of unstable structures 
increases the risk of such event. 
Fire danger for the SO is the least studied factor. It 
is related to availability of about 2000 tons of 
combustible materials in the object. At fire the 
risks of radioactive aerosol distribution beyond the 
industrial site are increased. 




4 MEASURES ON UNSTABLE STRUCTURE 
STRENGTHENING (STABILIZATION) 
4.1 The strategy of stabilization 
Erection of the SO on destroyed forth power unit 
structures and in extremely hard radiation 
conditions could not meet design regulations and 
norms for nuclear facilities, objects for radioactive 
waste handling and also for ordinary industrial 
facilities. 
The purpose of SO building structure stabilization 
is to decrease the danger of building structure 
destroying, causing to great radioactive material 
release into environment. 
Considering problems to insure SO safety and 
performing field surveys of unstable building 
structures, the NIISK specialists concluded that SO 
structure safety can be insured by strengthening of 
the most dangerous (according to radiation 
consequences of destroying) (unstable) object 
structures. Here we consider several stages 
(versions) of the object. 
The first stage considers a short-time (at least 10 
year) operation of the SO before building of a new 
“Shelter-2” Object above it. At this stage the short-
time stabilization of the existing “Shelter- 1” is 
necessary. 
The second stage considers more durable (about 50 
year) working life of “Shelter-1”. In this case 
radiation and nuclear safety is insured under the 
strengthened “Shelter-1”. Such scheme of 
formation needs structure strengthening for longer 
period. 
At works on problem of SO structure stabilization 
the most important task was to determine a list of 
structures, which should be strengthened. Long 
observations for building structure state and 
surveys of SO zones and structures were realized 
to determine a minimal number of measures, not 
decreasing a necessary level of reliability. 
The first list of stabilization measures, developed 
in SIP project (1997) as the first stage of SO 
formation as an ecologically safe system, had 29 
measures. Classification of stabilization measures 
was realized according to the object zones (the 
northern, eastern, southern and western). 
The assessment of 29 measures was performed, 
taking into account the requirements of the 
normative documents of Ukraine, results of 
realized surveys and repetition of normative load 
interval during 15 – 40 years. 
Within SIP project on package A, performed by 
International consortium “Chernobyl” - ICC (MK) 
JV in 1999 – 2000, the strengthened structure 
operation life reduction up to 10 – 15 years (for 
time, necessary for construction of the new safe 
confinement (NSC) and dismantling of the 
unstable structures) was analyzed and grounded. It 
helped to perform detailed calculations of the 
unstable structures, review a list of stabilization 
measures, reducing their number up to 20 and then 
up to 15. 
However, realization of even reduced list of 
measures (“List 15”) results in significant 
personnel radiation doses. Especially significant 
collective effective doses were necessary to realize 
works on fixing of covering structures, which were 
unstable at influence of tornado, when significant 
disclosure of the external covering and radiation 
release were possible. That is why, in the process 
of further work on project, design tornado 
characteristics at different criteria were assessed 
and possibility to reduce “List 15” up to 9 
necessary urgent measures, given below, was 
determined. 
The realized stabilization measures meet design 
criteria, approved by the State committee of 
nuclear regulation and insure a necessary SO safety 
level on the basis of fifteen year period of stable 
structure operation, taking into account the 
completion of new safe confinement construction 
within the given period. The time intervals of 
stabilization are determined, taking into account 
the general strategy of SO formation as 
ecologically safe system [8], assuming that new 
safe confinement (“Shelter – 2”) will be erected 
within the given period of time. 
4.2 Assessments of stabilization measure 
reliability 
On the basis of “weak zones” analysis the 
stabilization measures are determined and 
reliability of the given measures, which are given 
in table 1, is assessed. 
 
Table 1. Probabilities of SO structure failure before and 
after stabilization 
Structures or zones 





Zones of Б1, Б2 beam supporting along the axis 50 
on vertical load 1⋅10-4 1⋅10-4 
on horizontal load 2,0⋅10-3 1⋅10-4 




 1,3 ⋅10-1 1⋅10-3 
Supporting zones of “Mammoth” beam 
on vertical load 1,0⋅10-4 1⋅10-4 
on horizontal load 1,3⋅10-1 1⋅10-3 
Northern shields - sticks 1,4⋅10-2 1⋅10-4 
Southern shields 1,0⋅10-4 4⋅10-4 
Southern shields - sticks 1,4⋅10-2 4⋅10-4 
Western buttress wall 1⋅10-4 1⋅10-4 
Coating between the 
western buttress wall and 
the wall along the axis 50 
1⋅10-4 1⋅10-4 
Western sticks 1,4⋅10-2 1⋅10-4 




Determination of structure reliability is reduced to 
a comparison of load figures (internal forces) (Q) 
and structure strength (N), which are characterized 
by differential functions of distribution (fQ and fN) 
and failure parameters γ0: 
( ) ( )















  (1) 
The probabilistic and deterministic methods for 
analysis and assessment of structure destroying 
(failure) risks, caused by natural and industrial 
initial events, are used. 
Calculations show that probability of the structure 
failure is reduced by two-three after strengthening. 
The list of necessary urgent measures to increase 
the structure bearing capacity is determined. 
4.3 Assessment of stabilization terms in the 
time interval 
The analysis of interdependence of stabilization 
measures and new confinement construction 
showed that: 
- Stabilization is expedient. Urgent 
construction of the new safe confinement 
(NSC) results in great collective personnel 
radiation doses; 
- The pause between stabilization and NSC 
construction is possible, but not more than 
10 – 15 years. At pause of more than 20 
years the collective doses for stabilization or 
liquidation of possible SO building structure 
accident consequences are increased. 
4.4 Short-term stabilization measures 
9 short-term stabilization measures for SO zones, 
given above, were determined within SIP (see 
Table 2 and Fig. 5). The design documentation on 
stabilization measures was developed by the 
Ukrainian consortium “KCK” (KIEP, NIISK, ISP 
NPP). The calculations are performed, using 
software complex “Lira-Windows” (NIIASS of the 
State committee for construction, architectural and 
housing policy). 
The requirements on reliability of stabilization 
measures were developed in accordance with 
conditions of facility structure failures after 
realization of stabilization measures with 
probability of not more than 10-3 - 10-4. When 
stabilization measures were realized, probabilities 
of building structure failures were specified (Table 
3). 
 
Fig. 5 The “Shelter” Object stabilization zones, realized 
by the consortium “Stabilization” in 2004 - 2008 
 
Table 2. The list of urgent stabilization measures 
# of 
measure 
Name of measure 
Western zone 
2 “Shelter” Object western fragment 
strengthening 
Southern zone 
3 Stabilization of the deaeration stack frame 
Eastern and northern zones 
4 Local ventilation shaft strengthening 
5 Concreting of the upper part of the northern buttress wall 
Covering 
8 Connection of the southern “shields-sticks” 
with the southern shields 
11 Connection of the northern “shields-sticks” 
with the buttress wall, using anchor - locks 
14 “Mammoth” beam western support 
strengthening 
14а “Mammoth” beam eastern support 
strengthening 
w/n Repair of the light roof 
 
Table 3. Probabilities of structure failures after 
stabilization 
Zones of stabilization After stabilization 
Western zone 1,0·10 -4 ÷ 3,0·10 -5 
Southern zone 1,0·10 -2 ÷ 2,0·10 -3 
Northern zone 1,0·10 -2 ÷ 2,0·10 -3 
 
The Fig. 3,b shows the SO western fragment 
strengthening – the most complex and intensive 
stabilization measure #2, which was completed in 
2008. Below in Fig. 6 – 10 there is description of 
other urgent measures, realized within SIP in 2004 
– 2008 [9, 10]. 





Fig. 6. Stabilization of the deaeration stack frame 
(measure #3) 
 
Stabilization of the destroyed deaeration stack 
frame elements considered the installation of the 
additional metal deviated elements (struts), which 
connect the upper part of columns and have 
significant deviation from vertical to the side of the 
control room with floor structures, which are 
placed lower and have not significant damages. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Stabilization of the “Mammoth” beam western 
support (measure #.14) 
 
Stabilization considered the vertical cruciform tie 
strengthening by increasing of their section, using 
welding of the additional elements. 
 
Fig. 8. Stabilization of “Shelter” Object northern part 
(measure #.5 and #11) 
 
Realization of stabilization measures considered 
combination of two tasks: 
- combination of the “shield-stick” northern 
elements and buttress wall to one structural 
system (measure #11); 
- buttress wall strengthening by its upper part 
concreting (measure #5).Combination of 
“shield-sticks” and buttress wall was realized 
by installation and strengthening of anchor – 
locks in “shield-stick” support parts, their 
placement in wall internal space, which is 
not filled by concrete, but is going to be 
concreted in future. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Stabilization of the “Mammoth” beam eastern 
support (measure #14a) 
 
Stabilization was realized by concrete filling of the 
spaces, observed in support base. 





Fig. 10. Repair of the light roof (measure w/n) 
 
The repair of the light roof considered: 
- installation of the new covering of shaped 
decking on 40% of the roof area; 
- replacement of battens between roof blocks; 
- installation of covers and hatches for 
modernized dust suppression system. 
5 THE STRATEGY OF “SHELTER” OBJECT 
FORMATION 
Works on formation of SO as a safe system were 
realized on SO within Shelter implementation plan 
(SIP), which considered several strategically 
important stages of formation. 
5.1 SIP purposes and tasks 
The main purposes are determined in team report 
“The Chernobyl power unit #4. Shelter 
implementation plan”, prepared by members from 
Ukraine, Ministry of energy of the USA and 
European Union in May, 31, 1997. SIP is prepared 
on the basis of five purposes, which should be 
reached at its systematic realization, and includes 
22 tasks, classified according to the purposes: 
- Purpose 1 – Decrease of probability of 
building structure destroying/strengthening – 
includes necessary surveys, assessment and 
monitoring of seismicity, stabilization 
measures; 
- Purpose 2 – Decrease of accidental collapse 
consequences – solution of tasks on dust 
handling and preparing for accident; 
- Purpose 3 – Increasing of nuclear safety – 
includes tasks on SO water handling, 
characteristics of the fuel-containing 
materials (FCM), criticism and nuclear 
safety; 
- Purpose 4 – Increasing of personnel and 
environment safety – solution of tasks on 
technical safe, physical and fire protection, 
integrity monitoring system, data bases, 
radiological protection; 
- Purpose 5 – Long-term strategy and survey 
for formation of SO as ecologically safe 
system – development of the strategy, TEO, 
technology of FCM extraction, radioactive 
waste handling, creation of the new safe 
confinement for the further dismantling and 
FCM extraction. 
Ten stages of program, which determined scope of 
works and terms to take important solutions, were 
included to SIP. Three of them are key program 
solutions: 
- approvement of solutions on stabilization 
(П1); 
- solution for strategy of optimal localizing 
shell (П10); 
- solution on FCM extraction strategy, which 
determines optimal method and time of FCM 
extraction with grounded analysis of 
expenses and possibility for realization (П8). 
The main SIP purpose is to decrease risks for 
personnel, population and environment, to prepare 
the site and to realize SO formation as ecologically 
safe system for the next 100 years. The NSC 
creation is the basic mean to reach the given 
purpose. The NSC ensures the SO protection 
against current processes of structure degradation 
and fuel-containing materials, radioactive dust 
release to environment, including dust, which is 
expected to arise in result of accidental SO 
structure destroying. The NSC ensures safe 
conditions to realize early dismantling of the SO 
roof and other unstable structures and to realize 
works on long-term handling with fuel-containing 
materials (FCM) and other radioactive wastes. 
Below there is information on current realization of 
SIP tasks and purposes. 
5.2 Purpose 1 – Decrease of destroying 
probability – building structure strengthening 
The building structure strengthening decreased 
significantly the probability of their destroying. 
Realized in 2008 measures on stabilization of the 
forth power unit unstable structures were a result 
of significant decreasing of SO collapse probability 
during NSC construction and insurance of structure 
stability for the next 10 – 15 years, for which the 
New safe confinement (NSC) should be erected. 
5.3 Purpose 2 – Decreasing of the accidental 
destroying consequences 
The consequences of the SO destroying are 
decreased. This was realized by modernization of 
dust suppression system, using more areas to put 
dust suppression mixtures and use compositions 
with a high content of dry remains, and by 




development of effective measures of accidental 
planning for ChNPP, including SO. Realization of 
the given works was a result of strong protective 
shield covering creation on surfaces in internal 
space under SO roof and decreasing of radioactive 
dust rise. 
5.4 Purpose 3 – Increasing of the nuclear 
safety 
Three tasks were determined as necessary to reach 
the purpose. The understanding of FCM criticism 
risk was reached. The other determined tasks on 
FCM characterization were realized partially. It 
was decided that the complete FCM 
characterization should be related to long-term safe 
measures after SIP realization. It is also necessary 
to realize task on handling with water, placed 
inside of SO. 
5.5 Purpose 4 – Increasing of personnel and 
environment safety. 
The task to insure the personnel safety is improved. 
Tasks 15 and 18 are realized. The rest tasks are in 
stage of realization. The works on project of 
physical protection modernization and SO access 
control are close to be completed, what insures the 
necessary level of nuclear material and radioactive 
wastes (RAW) protection at construction of the 
NSC and its further operation. 
The works on increasing of SO fire protection are 
realized, what applies to decrease the risk of fires 
and their influence on personnel, population and 
environment. 
The works on design and installation of the 
integrity automotive monitoring system (IAMS) 
are close to be completed. IAMS operation helps to 
keep the object in safe state in the process of new 
safe confinement construction and for the next 
years up to fuel-containing material extraction. 
IAMS includes subsystems of control for nuclear, 
radiation safety, state of the most responsible 
building structures and seismic monitoring in zone 
of SO. 
The works on creation of integrity SO data base 
(ISDB) – a great information resource, which 
allows to manage the electronic archive, interact 
with integrity automotive control system, keep 
planning and safe work implementation, are 
completed. 
5.6 Purpose 5 – The long-term strategy and 
survey for formation of SO as an ecologically safe 
system. 
The tasks to achieve Purposes 5 are realized or in 
the stage of realization or nor realized, and strategy 
of SO formation as an ecology safe system should 
be specified. The preliminary strategy of FCM 
handling, determined by solution of П7, considers 
the realization of constant monitoring for FCM 
state and to use extraction, when the reservoir 
would be created, i.e. for some decades. 
Considering this time, it is inexpedient to develop 
early considered prototype of FCM extraction 
technology (task 20) to develop strategy of FCM 
extraction, taking into account cost and graph of its 
realization, because this work needs significant 
finances and dose expenses. Taking into account 
this information, international consult group does 
not recommend continuing works in this direction. 
It is necessary to take into account that necessary 
data on price, man-hour and dose expenses can be 
obtained in the process of realization of early SO 
unstable structure dismantling to develop strategy 
of FCM extraction. 
Work on Task 21 to develop the strategy of the 
safe confinement is completed. The results of 
works on creation of “Conceptual NSC project” 
were agreed by Regulating bodies and Project was 
approved by the Cabinet of Ministry of Ukraine in 
2004. 
Works on NSC design and construction, early 
dismantling of the SO unstable structures (task 22) 
are uncompleted. At present parallel to NSC 
construction there are also works on cleaning of 
the construction site territory against technological 
materials and radioactive wastes, construction 
works on erection of erection zone foundations, 
working platform and foundations of elevator 
towers for Arch assembly. 
6 NEW SAFE CONFINEMENT (NSC) 
DESIGNING AND CONSTRUCTION  
The key stage of the “Shelter-2” feasibility study 
was completed in July, 1995. Taking into account 
the comments elaborated by the Ukrainian side, the 
international «Alliance» developed the final 
solutions and submitted them to the Chernobyl 
NPP in as a multivolume set. The feasibility study 
second stage presentation was held in Kiev on July 
11-12, 1995. The main solutions and strategy of 
the Shelter-2 construction are described in the 
«Operational abstract». 
6.1 New «SARCOPHAGUS» - ARCH- 
Proposal of the «Alliance» consortium (France) 
The design solutions developers state, that the 
Arch shape of the Confinement will ensure the 
most balanced distribution of materials 
consumption, subsequent dismantling of the SO, 
and the improvement of the Shelter-1 safety. The 
“Shelter-2” structures are erected as an Arch on the 
erection site westward from the existing SO. As the 




Object becomes ready, its sliding in the eastern 
directions is being carried out. 
According to the «Alliance» assessment, the total 
costs of the SO transformation will be from 1.2 to 
1.5 $ billion. These costs do not satisfy in full the 
Technical Specification, as they do not include two 
important elements of the SO transformation, 
namely RAW management and Shelter-1 structures 
dismantling after the Shelter-2 erection. 
6.2 New Safe Confinement  
6.2.1 Preliminary input information  
Within the SIP framework the first priority 
packages were singled out. Presently, they have 
been implemented. The objective of these packages 
was to perform the preliminary investigations to 
ensure the basis for the future specific projects on 
the following issues: the assessment of unstable 
structures and of the consequent actions and 
development tendencies regarding the new 
confinement, as well as conceptual approaches to 
the RAW and FCM removal etc. 
To select a safe confinement conception the 
available reports and proposals on the confinement 
designs were analyzed. 
All existing conceptions were classified into 
groups based on the features similarity, in 
particular: 
- Conceptions, which do not envisage the 
creation of a new localizing envelope in 
order to use the part/parts of the existing SO 
by means of the stabilization or repair of the 
existing building structures; 
- Conceptions envisaging the creation of a 
new localizing envelope in order to ensure 
conditions for unstable structures 
dismantling and early FCM extraction and 
RAW management (commencement during 
15 years and accomplishment not later than 
in 100 years); 
- Conceptions envisaging the delayed (for 
more than 100 years) FCM extraction and 
RAW management. 
For verification and assessment of each conception 
conformity with functional objectives the 
requirements and criteria matrix was developed. 
Each safe confinement (SC) conception was 
assessed using these criteria. Based on the 
performed analysis, the three conceptions of the 
safe confinement, which to the best advantage 
comply with the specified criteria, were selected 
among 12 available conceptions. 
These three alternative conceptions include the 
following: 
- Small-sized confinement («FRAME»); 
- «ARCH» («VAULT»); 
- Dock-Cofferdam (“CANTILEVER”). 
The validity of taken solutions was confirmed by 
the analysis of these three versions of the SC. 
Further the three SC conceptions were analyzed 
and assessed using additional qualitative criteria.  
The independent Ukrainian experts have discussed 
the SC strategy in their paper, which was generally 
approved by the Scientific Council of the 
Construction Academy of Ukraine. The 
International Advisory Group (IAG) of experts 
also considered the SC various versions and drew a 
conclusion that up to now the available information 
is not sufficient to choose a single version of the 
SC for the subsequent elaboration during the next 
designing stage.  In the IAG opinion, all the three 
SC versions are exercisable, with the conception of 
the ARCH type confinement being the most 
satisfactory regarding the key functional 
requirements.  
In Fig.11 there are the overall views of the Safe 
Confinement three versions mentioned above and 
developed by the ICC (MK) JV Consortium. 
The structure of «FRAME» type confinement (Fig. 
11,а) is a spatial lattice with dimensions of 210х99 
m and 89,5-m height. The load-bearing structures 
of the shelter are composed of two main beams, 
arranged in the «north - south» direction. The roof 
trusses are arranged in the «east - west» direction 
and rest on the beams. 
The SC «CANTILEVER» (Fig. 11,b) is composed 
of two facilities of a different purpose – the 
engineering unit and the crane unit. The 
confinement overall dimensions (along the axes of 
load-bearing structures) are as follows: 
114х246х97 m. 
The arch type confinement allows covering the 
existing SO and the part of the Turbine Hall. The 
confinement is composed of the separate 
components: the arch structure proper, end walls 
and foundations. The arch structure is formed of 
four segments each 36 m long and having the axis 
spans of 257  m and height of 108 m (Fig. 11, c).  
The concept design (CD) for the safe confinement 
was elaborated on the ChNPP order by the united 
team of two consortia: 1) American-French 
consortium «ВISI» including Bechtel (leader 
company), Battel (USA) and EDF (France) and 2) 
Ukrainian consortium «KSK» including KiEP 
(leader organization), NIISK (a leader at the first 
stage) and International Scientific and Technical 
Centre (ISTC) «Shelter».  
Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine 
of 31.03.2003 №421 [12] has established a 
procedure for the Shelter Implementation Plan 
execution. In compliance with this Resolution, the 
procedures of New Safe Confinement designing, in 
which the requirements of the Ukrainian Building 
Code DBN А.2.2-3-2004 were taken into account, 
were defined as follows: 











Fig 11. The main design systems for the new Safe 
Confinement (SC): 
а) – «FRAME»; b) – «CANTILEVER»; c) – «ARCH». 
 
- NSC designing shall consist of three stages 
(CD, design, and work documentation) 
according to the DBN of Ukraine 
terminology and of two stages (conceptual 
design and detailed design) according to the 
Western terminology. Here the detailed 
design includes the implementation of two 
stages (designing and working 
documentation). The national and western 
approaches should be necessarily combined 
due to the conditions of all activities 
implementation at the expense of the EBRD; 
- The NSC feasibility study (conceptual 
design) and design (the first stage of the 
detailed design) should be subject to the 
public composite examination. Taking into 
consideration the above, the estimate 
documents shall be excluded from the NSC 
design documentation subject to the public 
composite examination and from the 
corresponding approval. The results of the 
entire previous activities and decisions made 
on the state level show that there is no need 
to additionally substantiate in the framework 
of the feasibility study the expedience and 
economic efficiency of the NSC 
construction. 
Moreover, the decisions made earlier definitely 
specify the NSC structure as an Arch, which shall 
be assembled at a distance from the NSC and then 
“slid” into the design position.  
6.2.2 NSC general characteristic 
In compliance with the goals of creation and 
functionality set forth in the conceptual design (the 
feasibility studies) the NSC shall contain the 
following main objects: the main building with the 
Arch structure; foundations; west and east end 
walls; auxiliary systems including systems 
ensuring the unstable structures 
dismantling/strengthening; technological building; 
auxiliary buildings and facilities (sewage pumping 
station, facility for fire-extinguishing means etc.). 
The NSC general view is given in Fig. 12. 
In the NSC CD the eight modifications of Arch 
roof configuration of round and paraboloidal shape 
were considered. The arch-shaped roof is east-
westward directed and consists of 13 arch 
structures arranged at a distance of 12.5 m from 
each other. The arch-shaped roof is 150 m long. 
The configuration was chosen due to the SIP 
package «А» recommendations and taking into 
account  the requirement to ensure the sufficient 
height for the 80-m crane beams arrangement and 
the crane working zone necessary for the SO 






Fig. 12. NSC general view 




6.2.3 Arch structure 
Arch structure is a metallic spatial structure with 
the span of 257 m, width of 150 m and height of 
108 m consisting of 12 sections of 12.5 m width 
and the east and west end walls (the distance 
between the chords of arch trusses is 12 m). The 
arch structure shall be equipped with all necessary 
processing tools.  
The subsequent stage of the SO transformation 
relates to the development of the Detailed 
(Working) Design of the NSC construction and is 
now being carried out by the International 
Consortium “NOVARKA” with the participation 
of the Ukrainian design, research-and-development 
and production enterprises. The NIISK and ISP 
NPP perform the functions of the ChNPP Client 
Engineer in this project. The main goal of their 
activities is to provide the engineering support in 
the consideration and analysis of the SIP design 
documents. This includes verification of design 
and construction solutions compliance with the 
normative documents of Ukraine, as well as an 
assistance in issues of nuclear and radiation safety, 
participation in integrated assessment of the 
conducted activities impact on the environment 
and execution of necessary engineering surveys 
and investigations at the ChNPP site. 
7 THE EARTHQUAKE IN JAPAN ON MARCH 
11, 2011 
On March 11, 2011, Friday, at 05:46:23 of 
Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) seismic 
stations of Japan and United States Geological 
Survey (USGS) recorded an earthquake of 9.0 
magnitude. The earthquake characteristics were 
given by the National Research Institute for Earth 
Science and Disaster Prevention [14]. 
The earthquake occurred in the Pacific Ocean at a 
depth of 24.4 km at a 130-km distance to the city 
of Sendai and in 178 km to the city of Fukushima 
in the North-Eastern region Tohoku of Honshu 
Island, the largest island of the Japanese 
Archipelago. The distance from the earthquake 
epicenter to Tokyo was 373 km [15]. 
The consequences of such accidents should be 
given the comprehensive investigation and the 
norms of designing and safe operation of the 
nuclear and other dangerous objects should be 
improved (Fig. 13). In 25 years nature has 
reminded us about this demand once more. The 
comfort safe conditions without any earthquakes 
and technogenous accidents, fires and explosions 
require increasing the safety culture and improving 











Fig. 13. The overall views of the destroyed power units 
in Ukraine, 1986 (а, b) and in Japan, 2011 (c, d) 
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